In this paper we formally study important Lee et al. voting protocol. 
Introduction
Electronic voting promises the possibility of a convenient, efficient and secure facility for recording and tallying votes. Many protocols specifying the interaction between voters and election administrators have been proposed [6, 10, 12, 3, 11, 7, 13, 15] . While voting of this kind appears to encourage higher voter turnout, it also carries the potential of making abuse easier to perform and easier to perform at a large scale. Such protocols involve a high level of concurrency and even small protocols are known to be extremely error-prone. Formal analysis is crucial to assess their security.
Among the properties considered desirable of electronic voting protocols are the following: * This work has been partly supported by the RNTL project PROUVÉ 03V360 and the ACI-SI Rossignol.
Privacy: the system cannot reveal how a particular voter voted.
Coercion-resistance: a voter cannot cooperate with a coercer to prove to him that she voted in a certain way.
The privacy property guarantees that the link between a voter and her vote remains secret. Coercion-resistance guarantees that the coercer cannot become convinced of how a voter votes, even if the voter cooperates with him. Of course the voter can tell a coercer how she voted, but coercionresistance asserts that she is unable to prove it, so the coercer has no reason to believe her. Intuitively, coercionresistance is a stronger property than privacy, since if it is possible for a coercer to detect the value of a voter's vote without the voter's cooperation, then it is certainly also possible with the voter's cooperation. Receipt-freeness is a related property that has also been studied in the literature, which is between coercion-resistance and privacy in strength:
Receipt-freeness: a voter does not gain any information (a receipt) which can be used to prove to a coercer that she voted in a certain way.
Note that in literature the distinction between receiptfreeness and coercion-resistance is not very clear. The definitions are usually given in natural language and are insufficiently precise to allow comparison. The notion of receipt-freeness first appeared in [4] . Since then, several schemes [4, 16] were proposed in order to meet the condition of receipt-freeness, but later shown not to satisfy it. One of the reasons for such flaws is that no formal definition of receipt-freeness has been given. The situation for coercion-resistance is similar. Systems have been proposed aiming to satisfy it; for example, Okamoto [17] presents a system resistant to interactive coercers, thus aiming to satisfy what we call coercion-resistance, but this property is stated only in natural language. Recently, a rigorous definition in a computational model has been proposed for coercion-resistance [13] . We present in this paper what we believe to be the first "formal methods" definition of receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. We use the applied pi calculus framework and we make a clear distinction between the two notions. One of the advantages of the applied pi calculus is that it allows us to reason about equational theories that allow us to model the less classical cryptographic primitives often used in voting protocols. It is difficult to compare our definition and the one given in [13] due to the inherently different models.
As is often done in protocol analysis, we assume the Dolev-Yao abstraction: cryptographic primitives are assumed to work perfectly, and the attacker controls the public channels. The attacker can see, intercept and insert messages on a public channel, but can only encrypt, decrypt or sign messages for which he has the relevant key. In the case of both receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance, we assume that the coercer has all the capabilities of the attacker on the public channels.
We consider that the difference between receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance lies in the powers of the coercer to interact with the voter during the voting stage. In receiptfreeness, we assume a coercer who simply examines evidence gained from observing the election process. Such evidence includes information provided by the cooperating voter, e.g., the voter's private key and random coins used for probabilistic encryption. In coercion-resistance, the coercer has additional capabilities. He can interact with the cooperating voter, for example by (adaptively) preparing messages which the voter will send during the process.
Coercion-resistance cannot possibly hold if the coercer can physically vote on behalf of the voter. Some mechanism is necessary for isolating the voter from the coercer at the moment she casts her vote. This can be realised by a voting booth, which we model here as a private and anonymous channel between the voter and the election administrators.
Receipt-freeness is formalised as an observational equivalence. Intuitively, a protocol is receipt-free if a coercer cannot detect a difference between Alice voting in the way he instructed, and her voting in some other way, provided Bob votes in the complementary way each time. (The purpose of introducing Bob here is to prevent the observer seeing a different number of votes for each candidate.) Alice cooperates with the coercer by sharing secrets, but the coercer cannot interact with Alice to give her some prepared messages.
In the case of coercion-resistance, the coercer is assumed to communicate with Alice during the protocol, and can prepare messages which she should send during the election process. This gives the coercer much more power. It turns out that observational equivalence is not flexible enough, and we generalise it to a notion which we call adaptive simulation. We expect that adaptive simulation will prove to be of interest for other kinds of properties and protocols than the ones we study here.
Although the three properties are formalised in markedly different ways, we prove that, in accordance with intuition, coercion-resistance implies receipt-freeness, which in turn implies privacy.
It is rather classical to formalize anonymity properties as some kind of observational equivalence in a process algebra or calculus, going back to the work of Schneider and Sidiropoulos [18] . However, to the best of our knowledge this is the first formalisation of the notion of not being able to prove in this kind of framework.
Our formalization of coercion-resistance gives interesting insights, such as the ability of the coercer to perform fault attacks. This kind of attack is also mentioned in [13] as a "randomization attack". The idea of a fault attack is to let the coercer test the behavior of a coerced voter by requiring this voter to send a garbage message at some point of the protocol. If the voter is unable to decide whether the message is garbage or not, the attacker may distinguish a voter following the coercer's instructions from a voter who is trying to cheat the coercer, as the protocol would block on the incorrect message. Verifying whether a message is correct or not is often difficult when for instance ciphertexts are sent. In practice, a coercer can use this technique to probabilistically check whether a coerced voter is behaving as expected. Avoiding these attacks requires to carefully choose some of the implementation issues.
Finally, we illustrate our definitions and the idea of a fault attack on a simplified version of a voting protocol proposed by Lee et al. [15] . Due to lack of space, some proofs are omitted. They can be found in [8] .
The applied pi calculus
The applied pi calculus [2] is a language for describing concurrent processes and their interactions. It is based on the pi calculus, but is intended to be less pure and therefore more convenient to use. The applied pi calculus has been used to study a variety of security protocols, such as those for private authentication [9] , for key establishment [1] , as well as an electronic voting protocol [14] .
To describe processes in the applied pi calculus, one starts with a set of names (which are used to name communication channels or other constants), a set of variables, and a signature Σ which consists of the function symbols which will be used to define terms. In the case of security protocols, typical function symbols will include enc for encryption, which takes plaintext and a key and returns the corresponding cipher text, and dec for decryption, taking ciphertext and a key and returning the plaintext. Terms are defined as names, variables, and function symbols applied to other terms. Terms and function symbols are sorted, and of course function symbol application must respect sorts and arities. By the means of an equational theory E we describe the equations which hold on terms constructed from the signature. We denote = E the equivalence relation induced by E. A typical example of an equational theory useful for cryptographic protocols is dec(enc(x, k), k) = x. For example, given this theory and terms T 1 = dec(enc(enc(n, k 1 ), k 2 ), k 2 ) and T 2 = enc(n, k 1 ), we have T 1 = E T 2 (while obviously the syntactic equality T 1 = T 2 does not hold). We write vars(T ) for the set of variables occuring in T . When vars(T ) = ∅ we say that the term T is ground.
In the applied pi calculus, one has (plain) processes and extended processes. Plain processes are built up in a similar way to processes in the pi calculus, except that messages can contain terms (rather than just names). In the grammar described below, M and N are terms, n is a name, x a variable and u is a metavariable, standing either for a name or a variable.
P, Q, R :=
plain processes 0 null process
Extended processes add active substitutions and restriction on variables:
is the substitution that replaces the variable x with the term M . Active substitutions generalise "let". The process νx.({ M / x } | P ) corresponds exactly to "let x = M in P ". As usual, names and variables have scopes, which are delimited by restrictions and by inputs. We write fv (A), bv (A), fn(A) and bn(A) for the sets of free and bound variables and free and bound names of A, respectively. We say that an extended process is closed if all its variables are either bound or defined by an active substitution.
Active substitutions are useful because they allow us to map an extended process A to its frame φ(A) by replacing every plain process in A with 0. A frame is an extended process built up from 0 and active substitutions by parallel composition and restriction. The frame φ(A) can be viewed as an approximation of A that accounts for the static knowledge A exposes to its environment, but not A's dynamic behaviour. The domain of a frame ϕ, dom(ϕ), is the set of variables for which ϕ defines a substitution (those variables x for which ϕ contains a substitution {M/x} not under a restriction on x). We denote by σ |X the substitution σ restricted to the set of variables X, i.e., σ |X = σ(x) if x ∈ X and σ |X = x otherwise.
An evaluation context C[ ] is an extended process with a hole instead of an extended process. Structural equivalence, noted ≡, is the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed under α-conversion on names and variables, by application of evaluation contexts, and satisfying some further basic structural rules such as A | 0 ≡ A, associativity and commutativity of |, binding-operator-like behaviour of ν, and when M = E N the equivalences
Example 1 Consider the following process P :
The first component publishes the message enc(s, k) by sending it on c 1 . The second receives a message on c 1 , uses the secret key k to decrypt it, and forwards the resulting plaintext on c 2 . P is structurally equivalent to the following extended process A:
A = νs, k, x 1 , x 2 .(out(c 1 , x 1 ) | in(c 1 , y).out(c 2 , x 2 ) | {enc(s, k)/x 1 , dec(y, k)/x 2 ) We have φ(A) = νs, k, x 1 , x 2 .{enc(s, k)/x 1 , k/x 2 } ≡ 0 (x 1 and x 2 are
under a restriction).
The following lemma will be useful in the remaining of the paper.
We can now define what it means for two frames to be statically equivalent [2] . 
Definition 1 (Static equivalence)
(ii) for all terms M, N with variables included in dom(ϕ i ) and using no names occurring inñ 1 orñ 2 ,
Two extended processes A and B are statically equivalent if and only if φ(A) ≈ s φ(B).
Example 2 Let ϕ 0 = νk.σ 0 and ϕ 1 = νk.σ 1 where 
The operational semantics of processes in the applied pi calculus is defined by structural rules defining two relations: structural equivalence (described above) and internal reduction, noted →. Internal reduction → is the smallest relation on extended processes closed under structural equivalence and application of evaluation contexts such that out(a, x).P | in(a, x).Q → P | Q and for any ground terms M and N , whenever
The operational semantics is extended by a labeled operational semantics enabling us to reason about processes that interact with their environment. Labeled operational semantics defines the relation α → where α is either an input, or the output of a channel name or a variable of base type. We adopt the following rules in addition to the internal reduction rules.
− → A Note that the labeled transition is not closed under application of evaluation contexts. Moreover the output of a term M needs to be made "by reference" using a restricted variable and an active substitution.
Definition 2 (Labeled bisimilarity (≈ )) Labeled bisimilarity is the largest symmetric relation R on closed extended processes, such that
In [2] , it is shown that labeled bisimilarity coincides with observational equivalence. We prefer to work with labeled bisimilarity, rather than observational equivalence, because proofs for labeled bisimilarity are generally easier. Labeled bisimilarity can be used to formalize many security properties, in particular anonymity properties, such as those studied in this paper.
Formalisation
In this section, we show how both receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance can be formalised. While receiptfreeness is expressed in terms of labeled bisimilarity, coercion-resistance requires the definition of a new simulation relation which we call adaptive simulation.
Voting protocols in applied pi calculus
Before defining the properties, we need to define what is an electronic voting protocol in applied pi calculus. Different voting protocols often have substantial differences. However, we believe that a large class of voting protocols can be represented by processes corresponding to the following structure.
Definition 3 (Voting process) A voting process is a closed plain process
The V σ i are the voter processes, the A j s the different election authorities and theñ are channel names. We also suppose that v ∈ dom(σ i ) is a variable which refers to the value of the vote and at some moment the outcome of the vote is made public. More formally, this means that there exists A such that:
We also define an evaluation context S which is as VP , but has a hole instead of two of the V σ i .
Note that it is likely that a voting process will have the property that for any permutation π on {1, . . . , n} there exists a process A such that VP (
} for some ϕ; in words, it is able to mix up the votes before publishing them. However, we don't require this property in general. Protocols that do not respect this property most likely do not respect privacy, but we do not wish to exclude them.
Privacy and receipt-freeness
Similarly to privacy, receipt-freeness may be formalised as an observational equivalence. In [14] , we modeled an election scheme as an applied pi calculus process VP , and formalised privacy as the observational equivalence between VP and another version of VP in which two voters V A and V B have swapped their votes. In the remainder of the paper we denote by V A and V B two particular processes such that
Hence v is the only free variable occuring in V A , respectively V B . Formally, privacy is defined as follows. We also formalize receipt-freeness using observational equivalence. However, we need to model the fact that V A is willing to provide secret information, i.e., the receipt, to the coercer. We assume that the coercer is in fact the intruder who, as usual in the Dolev-Yao model, controls the public channels. To model V A 's communication with the coercer, we consider that V A executes a voting process which has been modified: any input and any freshly generated names are forwarded to the coercer.
Definition 4 (Privacy) A voting protocol respects privacy
if S[V A { a / v } | V B { b / v }] ≈ S[V A { b / v } | V B { a / v }].
Definition 5 (Process P
ch ) Let P be a plain process and ch a channel name. We define P ch as follows:
• 0 ch = 0,
In the remainder, we assume that ch ∈ fn(P ) ∪ bn(P ) before applying the transformation.
Given an extended process A and a channel name ch, we need to define the extended process A \out (ch,·) . Intuitively, such a process is as the process A, but hiding the ouputs on the channel ch.
Definition 6 (Process
We are now ready to define receipt-freeness. Intuitively, a protocol is receipt-free if, for all voters V A , the process in which V A votes according to the intruder's wishes is indistinguishable from the one in which she votes something else. As in the case of privacy, we express this as an observational equivalence to a process in which V A swaps her vote with V B , in order to avoid the case in which the intruder can distinguish the situations merely by counting the votes at the end. Suppose the coercer's desired vote is c. Then we define receipt-freeness as follows.
Definition 7 (Receipt-freeness)
A voting protocol is receipt-free if there exists a closed plain process V , satisfying the two conditions below:
V is a process in which voter V A votes a but communicates with the coercer C in order to feign cooperation with him. Thus, the equivalence says that the coercer cannot tell the difference between a situation in which V A genuinely cooperates with him in order to cast the vote c and one in which she pretends to cooperate but actually casts the vote a, provided there is some counterbalancing voter that votes the other way around. According to intuition, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let VP be a voting protocol.
VP is receipt-free =⇒ VP respects privacy.
Before we prove this proposition we introduce two lemmas.
Lemma 2 Let A be an extended process, C an evaluation context and ch a channel name. If ch ∈ fn(C[0]) we have
C[A] \out(ch,·) ≡ C[A \out(ch,·) ].
Lemma 3 Let P be a closed plain process and ch a channel name such that ch ∈ fn(P ) ∪ bn(P ). We have
(P ch ) \out(ch,·) ≈ P.
Proof of Proposition 1. By hypothesis, there exists a closed plain process
By applying the evalution context νchc. ( |!in(chc, x) ) on both sides and by using Lemmas 2 and 3 , we deduce that: 
Formalising coercion-resistance
Coercion-resistance is a stronger property as we give the coercer the ability to communicate interactively with the
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voter and not only receive information. In this model, the coercer can for instance prepare the messages he wants the voter to send. As for receipt-freeness, we are going to modify the voter process. However, we give the coercer the possibility to provide the messages the voter should send. • 0 c 1 ,c 2 = 0,
Definition 8 (Process
where x is a fresh variable ,
As a first approximation, we could try to define coercionresistance in the following way:
This definition has an obvious problem as the coercer could oblige V A { c / v } c 1 ,c 2 to vote c = c. In that case, the process V B { c / v } would not counterbalance the outcome to avoid a trivial way of distinguishing.
To properly define coercion-resistance, we define a new simulation relation which allows the second voting process on the right-hand side to dynamically adapt its vote to correspond to the coercer's choice. Before defining this relation itself we have to introduce some more notation.
Definition 9 (X A ) Given an extended process A, we define X A to be the set of unbound variables that are not defined by an active substitution, i.e., X A = fv (A) \ dom(φ(A)).

Example 3 Consider the following extended process B:
We have X B = {z 1 , z 2 , z 3 }. This definition can be extended naturally to any sequences of reduction steps. Adaptive simulation ( a ) 
Definition 10 (X A (Aσ
Example 4 Let B be the process defined in Example 3. We have φ(B)
= {enc(z 1 , z 2 )/x 1 , enc(z 1 , z 3 )/x 2 }. Let σ = {z 1 → a, z 2 → b, z 3 → c}. Let B 1 = out(c 2 , x 2 ) | in(c 2 , y 2 ) | {enc(a, b)/x 1 } | {enc(a, z 3 )/x 2 } and B 2 = {enc(a, b)/x 1 } | {enc(a, c)/x 2 }. We have X B (Bσ → B 1 σ) = {z 1 , z 2 } and X B 1 (B 1 σ → B 2 ) = {z 3 }.
Definition 11 (
= σ A | X A (Aσ A →A σ A ) and θ B = σ B | X B (Bσ B → * B σ B ) ; (b) if Bσ B → B σ B then there exists A such that Aσ A → * A σ A and A θ A R B θ B where θ A = σ A | X A (Aσ A → * A σ A ) and θ B = σ B | X B (Bσ B →B σ B ) .
if Aσ
. Intuitively, adaptive simulation models the fact that no matter how the process A is closed and no matter how the environment reacts, B can be closed, such that the processes are indistinguishable. The existential quantification on σ B follows the reductions of A, in order to let B adapt to the inputs of the environment. While the (a) parts ensure that B indeed simulates A, the (b) parts ensure that B cannot "do anything more" than A. Finally, by the means of θ A and θ B we progressively close A and B, so that once their reductions depend on some variables, the value of these variables cannot be changed any more, i.e., they have to stick to their choices and cannot undo them anymore. Note that if A and B are closed processes A ≈ B if and only if A a B. Moreover adaptive simulation is transitive and enjoys several other useful properties stated below. Note that the converse is not true. Consider the two processes A and B described below:
x).out(c, a).out(c 2 , x)|in(c, z).out(c 2 , a)); B = νc.(in(c 1 , x).out(c, a).out(c 2 , a)|in(c, z).out(c 2 , y)).
We have that A a B. However there is no ρ B such that for all ρ A we have Aρ A ≈ Bρ B .
Corollary 1 Let A and B be two extended processes such that X
We say that an evaluation context is strict, if the hole does not appear under a restriction of a variable.
Lemma 5 Let A, B be two extended processes and C a strict evaluation context, such that fv
Note that in Lemma 5 we cannot consider any open context where
One might want to relax this condition to fv (C[0])∩fv(B) = ∅. However, this stronger version is not needed in the remainder and would complicate the proofs. For a similar reason we also restrict ourselves to strict evaluation contexts, as νy.A a νy.B.
We are now ready to define coercion-resistance.
Definition 12 (Coercion-resistance) A voting protocol is coercion-resistant if there exists a closed extended process V and a strict evaluation context C such that
where x is a fresh free variable.
The intuition of this definition is that whenever the coercer requests a given vote on the left-hand side, then V B can adapt his vote on the right-hand side and counterbalance the outcome. However, we need to avoid the case where
Therefore we require that when we apply a context C, intuitively the coercer, requesting
,c 2 to vote c, V in the same context votes a. There may be circumstances where V may need not to cast a vote that is not a. We discuss those in Section 3.4.
Proposition 2 Let VP be a voting protocol.
VP is coercion-resistant =⇒ VP is receipt-free.
Proof. We need to show that there exists V satisfying the conditions of receipt-freeness.
Thanks to Lemma 5, we know that:
Moreover, we have
Hence, we deduce that
For any substitution ρ such that dom(ρ) = {x} we have
Using Corollary 1 we obtain that
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Thanks to the transitivity of a , we deduce that
By the definition of a voting process, we have
where 
Fault attacks
Looking closely at the definition of coercion-resistance, one may notice that the intruder could have an unexpected strategy to distinguish the left-hand process from the righthand process. In protocols in which the voter is expected to submit certain messages to the election administrators, the arrangement between the voter and the coercer may involve the coercer preparing those messages for the voter. In this case, the coercer may submit messages to
with the pure intention to block the process on the left-hand side of the relation. If V is unable to detect that the message is incoherent, the process will not block on the right-hand side, thus yielding an observable difference. Our definition therefore allows V to block too and not to vote if V thinks that the messages sent by the coercer would block the protocol.
In a real-life scenario the intruder may use this method to test the loyalty of V A in a probabilistic way. For example, in one out of every one hundred coerced voters, the coercer might submit such a garbage message to the voter. If the voter is not genuinely cooperating with him by submitting the garbage message, and instead casts his own vote successfully, the attacker can perceive a difference.
We argue that this attack, if successful, is an attack against coercion-resistance, since it means that the voter knows that the coercer has the ability to detect whether the voter is cooperating with him or not. Launching the attack costs the coercer that particular vote, but it is a means of applying pressure on the voter to cooperate.
Our definition of coercion-resistance is correct with respect to this kind of attack. That is, a protocol which is vulnerable to the attack is not coercion-resistant according to our definition. A protocol is coercion-resistant if V can be chosen to mimic
Thus, if V can detect that the message from the coercer is incoherent, she can act in order to block the protocol, preserving the relation.
Example
In this section we apply the formalization, described in the previous section to a simplified version of the Lee et al. protocol [15] . One of the main advantages of this protocol is that it is vote and go: voters need participate in the election only once, in contrast with [10] , where all voters have to finish a first phase before any of them can participate in the second phase.
We simplified the protocol in order to concentrate on the aspects that are important with respect to receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance. In particular we do not consider distributed authorities. Nevertheless, the protocol is neither trivial to model nor to analyse and illustrates well subtle issues in coercion-resistance.
Description of the protocol
The protocol relies on two less usual cryptographic primitives: re-encryption and designated verifier proofs (DVP) of re-encryption. We start by explaining these primitives.
A re-encryption of a ciphertext (obtained using a randomized encryption scheme) changes the random coins, without changing or revealing the plaintext. In the ElGamal scheme for instance, if (x, y) is the ciphertext, this is simply done by computing (xg r , yh r ), where r is a random number, and g and h are the subgroup generator and the public key respectively. Note that neither the creator of the original ciphertext nor the person re-encrypting knows the random coins used in the re-encrypted ciphertext, for they are a function of the coins chosen by both parties. In particular, a voter cannot reveal the coins to a potential coercer who could use this information to verify the value of the vote, by ciphering his expected vote with these coins.
A DVP of the re-encryption proves that the two ciphertexts contain indeed the same plaintext. However, a designated verifier proof only convinces one intended person, e.g., the voter, that the re-encrypted ciphertext contains the original plaintext. In particular this proof cannot be used to convince the coercer. Technically, this is achieved by giving the designated verifier the ability to simulate the transcripts of the proof.
Our simplified protocol can be described in three steps. Firstly, the voter encrypts his vote with the collector's public key, signs the encrypted vote and sends it to an administrator on a private channel. The administrator checks whether the voter is a legitimate voter and has not voted yet. Then the administrator re-encrypts the given ciphertext, signs it and sends it back to the voter. The administrator also provides a DVP that the two ciphertexts contain indeed the same plaintext. In practice, this first stage of the protocol can be done using a voting booth where eligibility of the voter is tested at the entrance of the booth. The booth con- 
( l e t skvCh=skvaCh in l e t v=a in processV ) ( l e t skvCh=skvbCh in l e t v=b in processV ) )
Process 1. Main process
tains a tamper-proof device which performs re-encryptions, signatures and DVP proofs. Then, the voter sends (via an anonymous channel) the re-encrypted vote, which has been signed by the administrator to the public board. Finally, the collector checks the administrator's signature on each of the votes and, if valid, decrypts the votes and publishes the final results.
Applied pi calculus model
Cryptographic primitives as an equational theory. The equational theory is represented in Figure 2 . The functions and equations that handle public keys, probabilistic encryption and digital signature are as usual. To model reencryption we add a function rencrypt, that permits us to obtain a different encryption of the same message with another random coin which is function of the original one and the one used during the re-encryption. We also add a pair of functions dvp and checkdvp: dvp permits us to build a designated verifier proof of the fact that a message is a re-encryption of another one and checkdvp allows the designated verifier to check that the proof is valid. Note that checkdvp also succeeds for a fake dvp created using the designated verifier's private key.
Main (Process 1).
The main process sets up private channels and specifies how the processes are combined in parallel. Most of the private channels are for key distribution. ( * public keys of administrators * ) in ( pkaCh , pubka ) . in ( pkcCh , pubkc ) . ν r . l e t e= pencrypt ( v , pubkc , r ) in out ( chA , ( pk ( skv ) , e , s i g n ( e , skv ) ) ) . in ( chA ,m2) . l e t ( re , sa , dvpV )=m2 in i f checkdvp ( dvpV , e , re , pk ( skv ) ) = ok then i f checksign ( re , sa , pubka )= ok then out ( ch , ( re , sa ) )
Process 3. Voter process
The private channel chA is a private channel between the administrator and voters. This is motivated by the fact that the administrator corresponds to a tamper-proof hardware device in this protocol. For ease of presentation, we only model the protocol for two voters and launch two copies of the administrator and collector process, one for each voter.
Keying material (Process 2).
Our model includes a dedicated process for generating and distributing keying material modeling a PKI. Additionally, this process registers legitimate voters and also distributes the public keys of the election authorities to legitimate voters: this is modeled using restricted channels so that the attacker cannot provide false public keys.
Voter (Process 3).
First, each voter obtains his secret key from the PKI as well as the public keys of the election au-l e t contextC [ ] = ( ( * private key of V * ) in ( c1 , x1 ) . out ( chc , x1 ) . ( * public key of A * ) in ( c1 , x2 ) . out ( chc , x2 ) .
( * public key of C * ) in ( c1 , x3 ) . out ( chc , x3 ) .
( * nonce of V * ) in ( c1 , x4 ) . out ( chc , x4 ) .
l e t e= pencrypt ( c , x3 , x4 ) in out ( c2 , ( pk ( x1 ) , e , s i g n ( e , x1 ) ) .
( * dvp * ) in ( c1 , x5 ) . out ( chc , x5 ) . l e t ( re , sa , dvp )= x5 in i f checkdvp ( dvp , e , re , pk ( x1 ) ) = ok then i f checksign ( re , sa , pubka )= ok then out ( c2 , ( re , sa ) ) ) |
Process 8. Context C -coercion-resistance 5 Conclusion
In this paper we studied two particular anonymity properties of election protocols: receipt-freeness and coercionresistance. Although the properties are modelled using these different relations, we can prove that, according to the intuition, coercion-resistance implies receipt-freeness which itself implies privacy. Finally we illustrate the definitions on a simplified version of the Lee et al. protocol.
As future work we would like to automate the verification of observational equivalence. Although the ProVerif tool can in many special cases prove observational equivalence, it is not able to do so for privacy or the more elaborated properties of this paper. We foresee to investigate automatic verification of observational equivalence at least for a finite number of sessions (not authorizing replication) and for restricted classes of equational theories.
